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Abstract
Link prediction in dynamic graphs (LPDG) is an important research problem that has
diverse applications such as online recommendations, studies on disease contagion, organi-
zational studies, etc. Various LPDG methods based on graph embedding and graph neural
networks have been recently proposed and achieved state-of-the-art performance. In this
paper, we study the vulnerability of LPDG methods and propose the first practical black-
box evasion attack. Specifically, given a trained LPDG model, our attack aims to perturb
the graph structure, without knowing to model parameters, model architecture, etc., such
that the LPDG model makes as many wrong predicted links as possible. We design our
attack based on a stochastic policy-based RL algorithm. Moreover, we evaluate our at-
tack on three real-world graph datasets from different application domains. Experimental
results show that our attack is both effective and efficient.
1 Introduction
Graphs are often used to describe complex systems such as social networks, biology, social
and economic organizations, communication systems, power grid, etc. These real-world sys-
tems often evolve with time and can be modeled as dynamic graphs, where nodes/entities or
links/edges are dynamically added or deleted. Links, which represent the interactions between
nodes, are of great importance in the analysis of dynamic graphs; and one particular impor-
tant research problem is called link prediction in dynamic graphs (LPDG). Specifically, given
historical graph data of a real-world system, LPDG aims to predict its future graph structure
so as to better understand the evolution process. It is precisely that information in future
graphs would be valuable in various applications such as online recommendations, studies on
disease contagion, organizational studies, etc.
Various LPDG methods have been proposed in the past decade. Conventional methods
include feature-based methods [15, 39, 7, 20], generative methods [25, 37, 44], and deep neural
networks [19, 30, 5]. Recently, graph embedding (GE) methods [24, 28, 12] and graph neural
networks (GNNs) [17, 31, 35] have achieved great success in many graph-related tasks (e.g.,
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node classification, link prediction, graph classification, etc.) for static graphs. Inspired by
this success, many GE/GNN-based LPDG methods [18, 36, 22, 11, 41, 23, 10, 21] have been
developed, which extend original GE/GNN methods to the dynamic graphs via introducing a
recurrent mechanism that captures the temporal information of dynamic graphs. GE/GNN-
based LPDG methods have achieved great success in various applications such as forecasting
bitcoin user trading [23], traffic prediction [40, 36], predicting loan repayment [41], forecasting
message exchange in communication network [23], etc. For instance, DyGCN [21] combines
LSTM [14] and GCN [17] and achieves the state-of-the-art performance.
In this paper, in contrast to designing better LPDG methods, we take the first step to
study the vulnerability of LPDG methods. In particular, we consider a practical black-box
evasion attacks to LPDG— Given a trained LPDG model, we assume an attacker only knows
the predictions via querying the LPDG model, while not knowing the model parameters, model
architecture, etc. As to attacker’s capability, we consider that the attacker can perturb a certain
number of links/edges in the historical graphs, i.e., by adding new edges to or/and deleting
existing edges from these graphs. Then, the attacker’s goal is to learn to perturb the historical
graphs such that the LPDG model has as many wrong predicted links as possible in the future
graph. One possible way to perform such an attack is to formulate the attack as an optimization
problem. However, we emphasize that there are two key challenges. First, optimization-based
attack requires the attacker knows accurate gradient information related to model parameters,
which is difficult to obtain in the black-box setting. Second, optimization-based attack for
graph structure perturbation is a binary optimization problem, which is NP-hard.
To address the above challenges, we propose a reinforcement learning (RL)-based attack
to LPDG. Specifically, we can model perturbing (optimal) edges in a graph as executing (op-
timal) actions, which is based on solving a policy function in RL. Note that solving the policy
function only requires LPDG model predictions, and thus our attack does not need to know
model parameters. Moreover, our attack involves learning a nonlinear mapping from the high-
dimensional graph structure space to a low-dimensional representation space. Such a nonlinear
mapping can be easily parameterized by a neural network, and naturally fits the RL framework.
We implement our RL-based attack, specifically to DyGCN, by adopting the soft actor-critic
algorithm [13], which is a stochastic policy-based RL method that has demonstrated a stronger
exploration ability and a more stable training. We evaluate our attack on three real-world graph
datasets from different application domains. Our attack is effective. For instance, on Trapping
dataset, our attack can reduce the link prediction performance (measured by F1 score) by
37.9% when only 1% of total edges in a graph is perturbed. Our attack is also efficient. For
instance, the running time of our attack is linear to the number of perturbed edges.
2 Background and Problem Definition
2.1 Link Prediction in Dynamic Graphs
Given a finite sequence of undirected graphs G = {G1, G2, ..., GT }, where Gt = (Vt, Et), ∀t ∈
[1 : T ] denotes a snapshot graph at time step t, with Vt the set of nodes and Et the set of
edges/links. |Vt| and |Et| represent the number of nodes and number of edges in graph Gt,
respectively. W.l.o.g., we assume all graphs in G have the same node set V in this paper. We
use At ∈ {0, 1}|V |×|V | to represent the adjacency matrix for Gt, i.e., a(u,v)t = 1 if there is a link
between node u and node v in Gt, and 0 otherwise. For description convenience, we will use
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Figure 1: Link prediction in dynamic graphs via DyGCN. We use a single training
example (St−n:t−1, At) to illustrate DyGCN.
the adjacency matrix and graph interchangeably. For each v ∈ V , let xvt ∈ RD be v’s feature
vector and Xt = [x
1
t ;x
2
t ; · · · ;x|V |t ] ∈ R|V |×D be the feature matrix of all nodes in graph Gt.
Now, suppose we are given a set of Mtr training examples {(Str[t−n:t−1], Atrt )}n+1+Mtrt=n+1 ⊆
S × A, where Str[t−n:t−1] = {Atrt−n, · · · , Atrt−1} ∈ S consists of a sequence of n historical graphs
and Atrt ∈ A is the future graph to be predicted. Then, the goal of link prediction in dynamic
graphs is to learn a function FΘ : S → A, parameterized by Θ, from the historical graphs in
S to predict links in the future graphs in A. In this paper, we focus on DyGCN, as it achieves
the state-of-the-art dynamic link prediction performance.
2.2 Dynamic Graph Convolutional Network (DyGCN)
DyGCN combines GCN [17] with LSTM [14] to perform link prediction in dynamic graphs.
GCN was originally developed for a static graph. We first briefly review GCN. Suppose we are
given a graph Gj with adjacency matrix Aj and node feature matrix Xj . GCN stacks multiple
(e.g., L) graph convolutional layers, and each layer l learns a hidden node feature matrix H
(l)
j .
Formally, the node feature matrix at (l + 1)-layer is updated as follows:
H
(l+1)
j = σ(A˚jH
(l)
j W
(l)),
where A˚j is a normalized version of Aj , which is defined as A˚j = D˜
− 1
2
j A˜jD˜
− 1
2
j , where A˜j =
Aj + I, D˜j = diag(
∑
k A˜
(i,k)
j ); H
(0)
j = Xj ; W
(l) is the parameter matrix connecting the l-th
layer and the (l + 1)-th layer; σ(·) is a nonlinear activation function, e.g., ReLU .
In order to perform LPDG, DyGCN introduces multiple GCNs at different time steps and
adds an LSTM after each GCN. Specifically, at time step j, GCN is with an input Aj and the
output of GCN (i.e., H
(L)
j ) is treated as the input of an LSTM. Moreover, the output of LSTM
is denoted as Yj .
Now, suppose we have a set ofMtr training examples. For each training example (S
tr
[t−n:t−1], A
tr
t ),
each GCN takes a graph in Str[t−n:t−1] as an input, e.g., GCN at time step j takes A
tr
j as an
input. To predict links in the graph Atrt , DyGCN adds a fully connected layer after the final
output of LSTM at time step t− 1 (i.e., Yt−1), and maps the output to a matrix Zt ∈ R|V |×|V |
that has the same size as Atrt . Formally,
Zt = σ(fc(Yt−1,WZ)),
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where fc(·) is a fully connected layer with parameters WZ . As the entries in Zt are usually
not binary, DyGCN further performs the following transformation:
â
(i,j)
t =
{
1, z
(i,j)
t > 0.5;
0, otherwise,
where Ât = {â(i,j)t }|V |i,j=1 is the predicted graph.
We use the function FΘ to encompass all functions involved in DyGCN, where Θ contains
all parameters. Thus, Ât = FΘ(Str[t−n:t−1]). To train DyGCN, we minimize the loss function L,
which is defined as the reconstruction loss between the predicted graph and the ground truth
graph for all training examples. Specifically,
L({FΘ(Str[t−n:t−1]), Atrt }) =
n+1+Mtr∑
t=n+1
||Atrt − Ât||2F Bt,
where the weight matrix Bt ∈ R|V |×|V | is used to mitigate the issue caused by the sparse graph.
We set b
(i,j)
t = 1 if a
(i,j)
t = 0, and b
(i,j)
t = β > 1, otherwise. In our experiment, we set β = 10.
Adam [16] is used to train DyGCN and the learnt model parameters is denoted as Θ∗. Figure 1
illustrates DyGCN using a single training example.
2.3 Problem Definition
We consider black-box evavaion attacks to LPDG and focus on attacking DyGCN in this
paper. However, we note that our attack is applicable to any LPDG algorithm. Specifically,
given a trained DyGCN model FΘ∗ , we assume that the attacker only knows the predictions
(i.e., predicted graphs) via querying FΘ∗ , while not knowing the model parameters Θ∗ or
model architecture. Moreover, given a testing example (Ste[t−n:t−1], Atet ) where Ste[t−n:t−1] =
{Atet−n, · · · , Atet−1} consists of a sequence of n historical graphs, we assume the attacker can
perturb a fraction µ of the n graphs in Ste[t−n:t−1], and each graph is allowed to perturb (e.g.,
add new edges or remove existing edges) a certain fraction δ of the total links/edges. We denote
the perturbed testing example as S˜te[t−n:t−1] = {A˜tet−n, · · · , A˜tet−1}, where A˜tej = Atej + ∆Atej , if
Atej is perturbed by a binary matrix ∆A
te
j ; and A˜
te
j = A
te
j , if not. For simplicity, we consider
recent historical graphs, i.e., [Atet−µn : Atet−1], are perturbed. Then, the attacker’s goal is learn
to perturb the graphs, such that the link prediction performance on S˜te[t−n:t−1] evaluated by
FΘ∗ is maximally decreased. Formally, the attacker’s objective function is defined as follows:
max
{∆Atej }
err = I(Atet 6= FΘ∗(S˜te[t−n:t−1])), s.t. |∆Atej | ≤ δ · |Ej |, ∀j ∈ [t− µn : t− 1], (1)
where I(A 6= B) is a function that counts the total number of unequal elements between A
and B at the same position.
Directly solving Equation 1 to achieve the attacker’s goal is challenging, as it is a binary
optimization problem that is NP-hard. In the next section, we will introduce our RL-based
attack against DyGCN.
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Figure 2: Overview of our RL-based black-box attack to DyGCN. We take attack-
ing a snapshot graph Gt−1 as an example.
3 Our Proposed RL-based Attack
In this section, we propose to use RL to perform black-box evasion attacks to DyGCN. Our
RL-based attack is based on soft actor-critic (SAC) [13], which is a stochastic policy-based
RL method and achieves state-of-the-art performance. Comparing with optimization-based
attacks, RL-based attacks have two major advantages. First, perturbing (optimal) edges in
a graph (i.e., add new edges or delete existing edges) can be naturally modeled by executing
(optimal) actions based on solving a policy function in RL, while solving which is NP-hard
using optimization methods. Second, our attack involves learning a nonlinear mapping from
the high-dimensional graph structure space to a low-dimensional representation space. Such a
nonlinear mapping can be easily parameterized by a neural network and fits the RL framework.
The core idea of our attack is as follows: First, the attacker observes the current state
associated with a graph. Based on the current state, the attacker executes an optimal action
(i.e., add new edges and delete existing edges) by solving a policy function parameterized by a
policy network; and obtaining a reward, which relates to our objective function in Equation 1,
by solving a soft Q-function parameterized by a Q-network. Then, the attacker obtains the
next state and saves the current and next states, actions, and rewards as a trajectory in a
replay buffer. Finally, the attacker samples the trajectories from the buffer and adopts the
SAC algorithm to train our attack. Figure 2 shows our proposed RL-based attack to DyGCN.
The used notations and their descriptions are listed in Table 1.
3.1 The Attack Environment
A RL method consists of states, actions, rewards, and terminal condition. We first define the
attack environment from the attacker’s perspective, which involves how to represent states,
execute actions, define rewards, and determine the terminal condition. We take attacking
a single graph Gt−1 (At−1) in an example S[t−n:t−1] = {At−n, · · · , At−1} as an instance to
introduce our attack.
3.1.1 States.
We use sk to denote the state of the intermediate perturbed graph A˜
k
t−1 at the attack step k.
Thus s0 is the state of the clean graph At−1 and A˜0t−1 = At−1. Moreover, we also use sk to
indicate a low-dimensional embedding of the high-dimensional perturbed graph A˜kt−1. sk aims
to capture the latent structural information in the perturbed graph A˜kt−1. and it is learnt via
5
Table 1: Notations and descriptions.
Notation Description
Str/Sval/Ste Training/Validation/testing set
Mtr/Mval/Mte No. of Training/Validation/testing examples
FΘ∗ Learnt DyGCN model
Gj/Aj Ground truth graph at time step t
Ĝj/Âj Estimated graph at time step t
G˜j/A˜j Perturbed graph at time step j
Vp/Vn Popular/Neglected node set
n No. of graphs in a sequence
N No. of nodes in each graph
L No. of layers in GCN
PΦ Policy network
QΛ Soft Q-network
D Replay buffer
α Temperature hyperparameter
µ Fraction of perturbed graphs in an example
ρ Fraction of selected popular/neglected nodes
δ Fraction of total edges perturbed in a graph
T No. of training episodes
the following three steps: First, we observe all clean graphs in the example other than Akt−1
(i.e., from At−n to At−2 in this case), and select a fraction ρ (< 0.5) of nodes Vp ⊆ V with the
largest averaged degrees (called popular nodes) as well as the same fraction of nodes Vn ⊆ V
with the smallest averaged degrees (called neglected nodes) among those observed graphs (i.e.,
|Vp| = |Vn| = ρ|V |). Our intuition is that nodes with the largest/smallest averaged degrees can
maintain the primary information in a graph. Second, we encode the two node sets Vp and Vn
using two one-hot vectors op,on ∈ R|V |. Specifically, op,u = 1 if u ∈ Vp and op,u = 0 if u /∈ Vp.
Similarly, on,u = 1 if u ∈ Vn and on,u = 0 if u /∈ Vn. Third, we define the representation for sk
as follows:
sk =
[
s
(1)
k , s
(2)
k
]
,
s
(1)
k = g(A˜
k
t−1 · ((1− γ)op + γ/|V |)),
s
(2)
k = g(A˜
k
t−1 · ((1− γ)on + γ/|V |)),
(2)
where g(a) is a function g : R|V | → Rρ|V |, which first selects ρ|V | entries from the |V |-
dimensional vector a with indexes corresponding to Vp (or Vn) to form a new ρ|V |-dimensional
vector; and then applies a nonlinear activation function (e.g., ReLU in our paper) to the new
vector to obtain the ρ|V |-dimensional embedding for the perturbed graph A˜kt−1. Note that
we introduce a smooth regularization term γ/|V | in order to stabilize the training and reduce
overfitting. By default, we set γ to be 0.2. With Equation 2, each entry value in sk indicates
the importance of the corresponding node in Vp or Vn. For the implementation purpose, we
also store the mapping between the vector index i ∈ [1 : Vp] or i ∈ [1 : Vn] and the real node
index j ∈ V in the graph.
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3.1.2 Action.
We consider that the attacker only changes the link status among Vp and Vn. Our motivation
is based on the assumption that: when deleting edges among popular nodes or/and adding
edges among neglected nodes, the graph structure can be largely changed, and thus the DyGCN
model would make as many wrong predicted links as possible when evaluated on the perturbed
graph. Note that such a consideration can also reduce the computational complexity, as the
attacker does not need to search the entire graph structure. Moreover, to ensure that certain
graph property does not change significantly after the perturbation, we require the total number
of edges in the graph keeps the same in each attack step. Particularly, we consider that an
attacker executes an action by adding a new edge between a pair of nodes as well as deleting
an existing edge between another pair of nodes. Then, the purpose of the action is to search
two pairs of nodes, such that when executing the action, DyGCN’s performance decreases as
much as possible based on the current state. Specifically, we denote ak as the action at the
attack step k. Then, we design a policy to generate actions based on sk. Formally, we define
ak ∼ PΦ(ak|sk), (3)
where PΦ is a policy network parameterized by Φ. Equation 3 attempts to enforce that, when
nodes in Vp (or Vn) are relative more important at state sk, then they are more likely to be
selected as the action ak. In this paper, we define our policy network as a composition of
a 3-layer MLP network and a truncated normal distribution (TruncNorm) within an interval
[1, ρ|V |]. Specifically, the output of MLP is the mean and log-deviation of a TruncNorm; and
we then perform the action ak by sampling two pairs of nodes from the TruncNorm (with
rounding). Moreover, we note that the sampling process can be naturally divided into two
separate steps: we first perform an action a
(1)
k to sample a pair of nodes from Vp and then
perform another action a
(2)
k to sample a pair of nodes from Vn. Formally,
ak = [a
(1)
k ,a
(2)
k ] ∈ R2×2, Φ = [Φ1,Φ2] ∈ Rρ|V |×2,
a
(1)
k ∼ TruncNorm(a(1)k |µ1,diag(σ21), 1, ρ|V |]).round(),
µ1 = MLPΦ1(s
(1)
k )1:2 ∈ R2, log σ1 = MLPΦ1(s(1)k )3:4 ∈ R2,
a
(2)
k ∼ TruncNorm(a(2)k |µ2,diag(σ22), 1, ρ|V |).round(),
µ2 = MLPΦ2(s
(2)
k )1:2 ∈ R2, log σ2 = MLPΦ2(s(2)k )3:4 ∈ R2.
With ak, we can map each of its value back to the real node index via our stored mapping.
For simplicity, we still use ak to indicate the real node indexes. Moreover, when the attacker’s
action is to add an existing edge or delete a nonexistent edge, we will move to the next step.
Details of training the policy network PΦ is illustrated in the next subsection.
3.1.3 Rewards.
Given the state sk and action ak, the attacker obtains a new state sk+1. Naturally, if the link
prediction performance of FΘ∗ at state sk+1 is worse than that at state sk, then a positive
reward will be given, otherwise a negative reward. Based on this motivation, we design the
reward function as follows:
rk(sk,ak) =
{
fk − fk+1 if errk+1 > errk;
−µ · n otherwise, (4)
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where errk = I(Akt 6= FΘ∗(S˜k[t−n:t−1])) corresponds to our objective function in Equation 1 at
the k-th attack step. fk is a function to measure the effectiveness of FΘ∗ on the perturbed
graphs for link prediction at state sk. If err
k+1 > errk, which means our attack generates more
wrong predicted links at the k+1-th attack step, then the gap between fk and fk+1 is positive.
Furthermore, if the positive gap is larger, then our attack is more effective. Thus, we can use
this positive gap as a positive reward rk. Otherwise, if our attack performs worse at the attack
step k + 1, then we set a large negative reward to penalize this step.
To obtain a optimal expected reward and guide the policy network PΦ, we also need to solve
a Q-function, which is parameterized by a soft Q-network QΛ. In our paper, soft Q-network
uses the same MLP as the policy network. Specifically, Q-network takes a (state, action) pair
as an input and outputs a score that indicates the effectiveness of the action. Its associated
Bellman equation is defined as:
QΛ(sk,ak) := rk(sk,ak) + λEsk+1 [V(sk+1)], (5)
where
V(sk) = Eak∼PΦ [QΛ(sk,ak)− α logPΦ(ak|sk)] (6)
is the state value function that denotes the expected reward obtained by the attacker at state
sk. The discount factor λ = 0.99 is to limit the sum of the expected rewards. Details of
training the soft Q-network is shown in the next subsection.
3.1.4 Terminal.
As required for the attacker, the number of modified edges for each perturbed graph in the
sequence is limited to δ. During the training process, the steps for each training episode is
finite and fixed. In each attack step, the attacker agent adds a new edge as well as deletes an
existing edge, therefore there are at most δ/2 steps per episode.
3.2 Maximum Entropy Reinforcement Learning
We use the soft actor critic (SAC) algorithm [13], a method of maximum entropy reinforcement
learning (MERL), to train our attack model. This algorithm maximizes the entropy of the
policy as well as the expected reward. Compared with other RL algorithms, SAC has a
stronger exploration ability and a more stable training. We first define the loss function of the
policy network PΦ and the soft Q-network QΛ; and then show how to train them.
3.2.1 Policy Network.
Its loss function is defined as
LPΦ = Esk∼D [Eak∼PΦ [α log(PΦ(ak|sk))−QΛ(sk,ak)]] , (7)
where D is a replay buffer which collects a set of previous states, actions, and rewards. α is a
temperature parameter that controls the stochasticity of the optimal policy. In practice, α is
an important parameter that is learnt as follows:
Lα = Eak∼PΦ [−αlogPΦ(ak|sk)− αH0], (8)
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Algorithm 1: Train our attack model on a validation set.
Require:
A set of Mval validation examples (Sval,Aval) = {(Sval[t−n:t−1], Avalt )}n+1+Mvalt=n+1 . Trained
DyGCN model: F∗Θ. Hyperparameters: T, µ, ρ, δ, n.
Ensure:
Our trained attack model Θatt = {Φ∗, α∗,Λ∗}.
1: Initialize the model parameters Φ, α, Λ;
2: Initialize the replay buffer D;
3: for each Sval[t−n:t−1] ∈ Sval do
4: Select µ fraction of n graphs (denoted as Svalµ ) from S
val
[t−n:t−1] to be attacked;
5: Select Vp and Vn using the other (1− µ)n graphs;
6: for each graph Aj ∈ Svalµ do
7: Initialize the perturbed graph A˜0j ← Aj ;
8: while episode epi ≤ T do
9: while attack step k ≤ δ/2 do
10: Learn sk based on A˜
k
j via Eq. (2);
11: Sample an action ak at state sk via Eq. (3);
12: Obtain reward rk via Eq. (4) and F∗Θ;
13: Update state sk+1 = {sk,ak};
14: Update perturbed graph A˜k+1j ← A˜kj
⋃
ak;
15: Update buffer D ← D ∪ {sk,ak, rk, sk+1};
16: Sample a batch of trajectories from D;
17: Update Φ, α, Λ according to Eq.(7)-Eq.(10).
18: end while
19: end while
20: end for
21: end for
22: return Attack model parameters {Φ∗, α∗,Λ∗}.
where H0 is a predefined entropy threshold (e.g., H0 = −2 in our paper). Minimizing loss func-
tion in Equation 7 can make the policy PΦ select multiple attractive actions whose probabilities
are similar, instead of focusing on a single determinate action.
Furthermore, to estimate the density of the Q-function with a lower variance estimator, we
usually apply a reparameterization trick to reparameterize the policy using a neural network
transformation fΦ(k; sk), where k is an input noise, sampled from, e.g., a normal Gaussian
distribution. Then, we can rewrite the loss in Equation 7 as
LPΦ = Esk∼D,k∼|V|[α · logPΦ(fΦ(t; sk)|sk)−QΛ(sk, fΦ(k; sk))]. (9)
3.2.2 Soft Q-Network.
Its loss function is defined as:
LQΛ = E(sk,ak)∼D[
1
2
(QΛ(sk,ak)− rk(sk,ak)− λ(QΛ(sk+1,ak+1) + α log(PΦ(ak+1|sk+1))))2],
(10)
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Algorithm 2: Evaluate our attack model on a testing set.
Require:
A set of Mte testing examples (Ste,Ate) = {(Ste[t−n:t−1], Atet )}n+1+Mtet=n+1 . Trained DyGCN
model: F∗Θ. Trained attack model Θatt. Parameters: µ, ρ, δ, n.
Ensure:
Perturbed testing examples S˜te and score f(S˜te).
1: for each Ste[t−n:t−1] ∈ Ste do
2: Select µ fraction of n graphs (denoted as Steµ ) from Ste[t−n:t−1] to be attacked;
3: Select Vp and Vn using the other (1− µ)n graphs;
4: for each Aj ∈ Steµ do
5: Initialize the perturbed graph A˜0j ← Aj ;
6: while attack step k ≤ δ/2 do
7: Obtain state sk based on Eq. (7) and action ak using the attack model Θatt and
F∗Θ;
8: Update perturbed graph A˜k+1j ← A˜kj
⋃
ak;
9: end while
10: end for
11: end for
12: return S˜te, f(S˜te)
where sk and ak are sampled from the relay buffer D, and ak+1 is sampled from the policy
during the training process.
3.2.3 Attack model training.
After defining the loss function of the parameterized policy network, parameterized soft Q-
network and temperature parameter, we can now train our RL-based attack model. Suppose we
are given a trained DyGCN model FΘ∗ , a validation set, and a testing set. We use the validation
set and the Adam algorithm to train our attack against the DyGCN model. Specifically, we
first update the parameters Φ in the policy network PΦ, which guides the policy improvement;
Then, we update the temperature parameter α based on updated parameters Φ. Third, we
update the parameter Λ in the soft Q-network, which evaluates the effectiveness of the policy.
We iteratively and alternatively update these parameters until reaching the terminal condition.
Finally, we can evaluate our trained attack model on a testing set. The training process and
evaluation process of our attack are detailed in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Dataset description.
We evaluate our RL-based black-box evasion attack to DyGCN, a state-of-the-art LPDG
method, on three graph datasets, i.e., Haggle, Hypertext, and Trapping, from three differ-
ent domains. We split each dataset into 30 graphs in a chronological order.
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Table 2: Dataset statistics.
Dataset Nodes Edges Graphs
Haggle 274 28.2k 30
Hypertext 113 20.8k 30
Trapping 1.5k 4.6k 30
(a) Haggle (b) Hypertext (c) Trapping
Figure 3: Impact of δ (ρ = 0.30, δ = 0.02).
• Haggle. This is a social network available at KONECT1, representing the connection
between users measured by wireless devices. A node represents a user and an link between
two person indicates a contact between them. The dataset was collected within 5 days.
• Hypertext. This is a face-to-face contact network of 100 attendees to the ACM Hypertext
2009 conference held in Turin, Italy over three days from June 29 to July 1, 2009. The
network is provided by SocioPatterns2. In the network, a node represents a conference
attendee, and an edge represents a face-to-face contact between two attendees that was
active for at least 20 seconds.
• Trapping. This is a real-world animal interaction network from Network Data Repos-
itory3. The animal interaction data were from published studies of wild, captive, and
domesticated animals. Each node represents an animal, a mammal, or a voles. An edge
was added into the network whenever two voles were caught in at least one common trap
over the primary trapping sessions. Each network in the dataset has a 12-hour time span.
4.1.2 Configuration.
Each dataset is divided into a training set, a validation set, and a testing set, where each
training/validation/testing example consists of a sequence of n = 10 graphs. As each dataset
has 30 graphs, we have 20 examples in total. We use Mtr = 10 training examples to train
DyGCN; Mval = 5 validation examples to train our attack model; and the remaining Mte = 5
testing examples to evaluate our attack. All our experiments are performed on a Linux machine
with 128GB memory and 10 cores.
1http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/contact
2http://www.sociopatterns.org/datasets
3http://networkrepository.com/mammalia-voles-rob-trapping.php
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(a) Haggle (b) Hypertext (c) Trapping
Figure 4: Impact of ρ (δ = 0.02, µ = 1.0).
(a) Haggle (b) Hypertext (c) Trapping
Figure 5: Impact of µ (δ = 0.02, ρ = 0.30).
In DyGCN, the number of GCN layers is L = 3 with each layer having 64 units, and LSTM
has 2 layers. As our graph datasets do not have node features, we thus use the identity matrix
to represent node feature matrix, similar to [35]. In our attack, there are several key parameters
that could affect the attack performance: the fraction µ of total graphs to be perturbed in an
example; the fraction ρ of total nodes to be selected as the popular/neglected nodes; and the
fraction δ of total edges to be perturbed in each graph. By default, we set µ = 1.0, ρ = 0.30,
and δ = 0.02. We also explore the impact of these parameters. We fix the other parameters as
the default value when we study one specific parameter. Specifically, we set µ = {0.6, 0.8, 1.0},
ρ = {0.15, 0.30, 0.45}, and δ = {0.01, 0.02, 0.05}.
4.1.3 Compared attacks.
There are no existing works on attacking dynamic link prediction in the black-box setting.
Here, we propose two baseline attacks and compare them with our attack under the same
setting (e.g., the same number of graphs to be attacked, the same attack budget).
• Random-whole. In this attack, the attacker randomly deletes an edge from and adds
an edge to the whole graph in each attack step.
• Random-partial. In this attack, in each attack step, the attacker randomly selects a
pair of nodes from Vp and deletes the edge if an edge exists between them; and selects
another pair of nodes from Vn and adds the edge if there is no edge between them.
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Table 3: Link prediction results on clean data
Dataset Haggle Hypertext Trapping
No attack(NO) 0.9502 0.5576 0.6501
Random-whole(R-W) 0.9467 0.5532 0.5512
Random-partial(R-P) 0.9353 0.5361 0.5024
Our attack(Ours) 0.8322 0.4645 0.3542
4.1.4 Evaluation metric.
Similar to existing works [5, 23, 21], we use F1 score to evaluate the performance of a link
prediction algorithm. Thus, the function f in Equation 4 is the F1 score. The higher/lower
the F1 score, the better/worse the link prediction method is. All results are reported in an
averaged F1 score on the testing examples.
4.2 Attack Results on DyGCN
4.2.1 Effectiveness of our attack.
Table 3 shows DyGCN’s performance on the clean graphs, i.e., no attack, and the perturbed
graphs, i.e., with our attack and two random attacks. We observe that our attack is effec-
tive. For instance, compared with no attack, our attack has an 12.4%, 16.7%, and 45.5%
F1 score degradation on the three datasets, respectively. Moreover, our attack is much more
effective than random attacks. For instance, on Trapping, our attack has a 30.3% and 22.8%
performance gain over Random-whole attack and Random-partial attack, respectively.
4.2.2 Impact of δ.
Figure 3 shows DyGCN’s F1 score under all compared attacks vs. fraction δ of total edges
perturbed. We observe that as δ increases, all attacks have better attack performance. This
is because, a larger δ indicates that an attacker is capable of perturbing a larger number of
links/edges. Moreover, our attack is much more effective than random attacks at a given δ.
For instance, when only 1% edges can be perturbed, our attack can reduce the F1 score with
8.8%, 9.0%, 37.9%, while random attacks reduce around 1.3%, 1.4%, and 16.6%, on the three
datasets, respectively.
4.2.3 Impact of ρ.
Figure 4 shows DyGCN’s F1 score under all compared attacks vs. fraction ρ of total nodes
selected as the popular/neglected node set. Similarly, we observe that as ρ increases, all
attacks’ performance increases. However, our attack requires a much smaller ρ than random
attacks, in order to achieve a promising attack performance.
4.2.4 Impact of µ.
Figure 5 shows DyGCN’s F1 score under all compared attacks vs. fraction µ of total graphs
perturbed in each example. Similarly, we observe that as µ increases, F1 score of all attacks
decreases. However, our attack obtains a good attack performance when perturbing a relatively
smaller number of graphs (e.g., µ = 0.6).
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Figure 6: Running time of training our attack vs. ρ, µ, and δ.
4.2.5 Efficiency of our attack.
We use running time as the metric to evaluate the efficiency of training our attack. Figure 6
shows the running time vs. ρ, µ, and δ on Haggle. When we observe one fraction, the other
two are set to default values. Note that we have similar observations on the other two datasets,
and thus show results on Haggle for simplicity. We observe that the running time is linear to
the three parameters. Thus, we can conclude that our attack is also efficient.
5 Conclusion
We propose the first black-box evasion attack against graph neural network-based link pre-
diction in dynamic graphs (LPDG). Our attack aims to perturb the graph structure so as
to fool the LPDG model, while not knowing the model parameters, model architecture, etc.
We formulate our attack as an optimization problem, which is NP hard, and then develop
a reinforcement learning-based method to realize our attack. Experimental results on three
real-world graph datasets show that our attack is both effective and efficient.
6 Related Work
We review existing works that perform attacks against graph data. These methods can be
summarized as attacking graph-based clustering [6], graph-based collective classification [29,
32], graph embedding [9, 26, 3, 1, 2], and graph neural networks [42, 8, 43, 32, 33, 34, 27, 38].
For instance, [6] designed a practical attack against spectral clustering, a type of graph-based
clustering methods. [32] proposed an attack against the collective classification method, called
linearized belief propagation, by manipulating the graph structure. Zu¨gner et al. [42] developed
a Nettack method to attack graph convolutional network (GCN) [17] by perturbing both the
node features and graph structure. However, we note that all these attacks focus on attacking
a single static graph.
To the best of our knowledge, only one work [4] studies adversarial attacks to link prediction
in dynamic graphs. However, this attack is white-box (i.e., the attacker knows all information
about the trained model), and is specially designed for a specific LPDG method called deep
dynamic graph embedding. In contrast, our attack is black-box and is applicable to arbitrary
LPDG methods. In our work, for simplicity, we focus on attacking the state-of-the-art DyGCN
method [21].
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